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SELF-DEFENSE AND THE PSYCHOTIC AGGRESSOR
George P. Fletcher*
Luis E. Chiesa**
Can one justifiably kill a faultless, insane assailant to save oneself or another from
imminent and serious harm? Although scholars on both sides of the Atlantic agree that
the person attacked should not be punished for defending herself from the psychotic
aggressor, there is significant disagreement with regards to whether the defensive
response should be considered justified or merely excused. Furthermore, amongst those
who argue that the appropriate defense in such cases is a justification, there is
disagreement regarding whether the specific ground of acquittal should be self-defense or
necessity.
I. THE PROBLEM
The hypothetical case of the psychotic aggressor was first put forth by one of us
more than 35 years ago:
Imagine your companion in an elevator goes berserk and attacks you with a knife.
There is no escape: the only way to avoid serious bodily harm or even death is to
kill him. The assailant acts purposively in the sense that he rationally relies on
means that further his aggressive end. He does not act in a frenzy or in a fit, yet it
is clear his conduct is nonresponsible. If he were brought to trial for his attack, he
would have a valid defense of insanity.
In general form, the problem is whether force may be justifiably exerted against
excused but unjustified aggression. More specifically, there are two basic questions posed
by the case of the psychotic aggressor. First, if the victim of the attack defends himself
*
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and kills the aggressor, should he be acquitted? Secondly, if a third party, a stranger,
intervenes on behalf of the victim and kills the aggressor, should he be acquitted?
The answer to the first question is relatively easy: it is hard to see either the
justice or efficacy of punishing someone who kills for the sake of self-preservation. The
more difficult issue is whether third persons should be allowed to intervene without
risking criminal conviction. If one party to the affray must die, either the insane aggressor
or his victim, why should an outsider be encouraged to take sides? Neither is morally at
fault; neither deserves to die. Yet it is hard to deny the pull in the direction of favoring
the victim of the attack and permitting intervention to restrain and disable the aggressor.
II. FIVE FAILED APPROACHES
A. Necessity as an Excuse
It is easy to solve the first-person case as a matter of necessity as an excuse. The
claim would be that even though killing the insane aggressor is wrong, it is the natural
expression of the human instinct for survival. The claim seems sound; no one can be
blamed for killing to save his own life.
The problem with this approach is that it fails to account for our intuition that if a
third party stranger had to choose between you and the aggressor, he would be right and
proper in favoring you, the innocent victim facing death, over the aggressor endangering
your life. Reducing the victim’s claim to the level of an excuse is to concede that killing
the psychotic aggressor is wrong. If killing the aggressor is wrong, why should anyone
have a right to voluntarily intervene on behalf of the victim of the attack? An excuse of
necessity in such cases would be limited to parties who stand in a close relationship with
the person being attacked.
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These implications conflict with our sense of justice in the situation. If there is
anyone who should be assisted it is the party struggling to save his life against the
psychotic aggressor, not vice versa. These counterintuitive results derive from conceding
that resisting the psychotic aggressor is wrongful though excusable. An adequate theory,
one that would permit third parties to intervene against (and not for) the psychotic
aggressor, would have to hold that resistance was not merely excusable but indeed
justifiable.

B. Self-Defense as an Excuse

Larry Alexander has argued that “when the aggressor is morally innocent, then
self-defense, if it exonerates, cannot always be treated as a matter of justification.”1 Thus,
he contends that an “attack by innocent aggressors is better characterized as a case of
duress that excuses homicide, not a case of Wrong that justifies it.”2 Alexander’s view is
driven by his belief that there are no morally relevant reasons that should lead us to
assume that the interest in survival of the defending party outweighs the interest in
survival of the insane aggressor.
Insofar as Alexander’s solution is premised on excusing the killing of the
psychotic aggressor, it gives rise to the same counterintuitive results that were discussed
in the previous section. Furthermore, by focusing on the relatively narrow question of
whether the interests of one party outweigh the interests of the other, Alexander fails to
acknowledge one very important feature of the case: that the victim of the psychotic
1
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aggressor’s attack does not lose his right to be free from unwarranted invasions of his
living space merely because his assailant is insane. The focus should be on examining
the comparative rights of the parties, not on undertaking a balancing of their relative
interests in survival.
In a sense, it is unfortunate that the psychotic aggressor has to suffer an invasion
of his sphere of autonomy so that the victim can vindicate her rights. Insane assailants
are, after all, innocent aggressors. However, it would be much more unfortunate if the
law were to adopt Alexander’s view and tell the victim that she cannot lawfully defend
herself from an insane assailant’s unjustified attack. No one has a duty to capitulate to
wrongful aggression.

C. Necessity as a Justification

Although excusing the killing of the psychotic aggressor leads to counterintuitive
results, perhaps we can avoid such implications by justifying his killing under a theory of
necessity. The problem with this approach is that one would have to find that taking the
life of the psychotic aggressor constituted the “lesser evil” under the circumstances. Yet
the most that can be gained from the killing is the saving of one’s life. If it is life against
life, it is hard to see why we should say that it is justifiable for one person to live and the
other to die.
The fact is that in the case of the psychotic aggressor, we are inclined to favor an
acquittal even if the loss to the aggressor is greater than the gain to the defendant.
Indeed, as the problem is stated, that is the case. For all the defending party knows is that

there is a possibility of death if he does not resist. To fend off this possibility, he chooses
certain death for the aggressor. When relevant probabilities are included in assessing the
competing interests, it is clear the defendant engages in conduct with a higher expected
loss (certain death) than expected gain (a probability of death). We could decrease the
threat to the defendant without altering our intuitive judgment about the desirability of an
acquittal. Would it make any difference if the defendant were threatened with loss of
limb, rape or castration? One would think not. As the problem is treated in the literature,
it is assumed that justice would require acquittal in these cases as well.
Perhaps those that look at the problem as one of justifiable necessity think that the life
of the insane aggressor is worth less than the life of the defendant who is standing his
ground. One finds analogies between psychotic aggressors and attacks by wild animals.
If one thinks of the psychotic aggressor as subhuman, one might be able to justify the
defensive killing as an act preserving the greater value. This is an intriguing if startling
approach, but one that is apparently inadequate. Among its other defects it fails to
account for the case of temporary psychosis. If the aggressor is a brilliant but temporarily
deranged scientist, it would seem rather odd to say that his life is worth less than that of
his victim, who for all we know might be a social pariah.

D. Interest Balancing Approaches to Justifiable Self-Defense

One could be tempted to adopt an interest balancing approach to self-defense that
justifies conduct when the interest preserved by the defensive action outweighs the
interest harmed. As such, it constitutes a variation on the choice of evils defense. This

approach is well-equipped to explain the justifiable nature of standard cases of selfdefense in which the aggressor acts culpably. In such instances, the culpability of the
aggressor is used as a rationale for diminishing the interests of the assailant relative to
those of the victim. By depreciating the culpable aggressor’s interest in the balancing
process, it is possible to justify the use of defensive force even when the physical harm
averted by the victim is of equal value to the one visited upon the aggressor.
Yet with culpability as its pinion, the interest balancing approach to self-defense
cannot solve the problem of the psychotic aggressor. By definition the psychotic
aggressor is not culpable and thus this conception of self-defense fails to explain why his
interests should be worth less than those of the victim.

E. Passive Necessity as a Justification

Continental scholars have increasingly turned to passive necessity whenever their
traditional theories of choice of evils and self-defense fail to justify conduct that they
believe ought to be considered lawful. The claim of passive necessity, which has yet to
find legislative or scholarly support in common law jurisdictions, justifies conduct that is
aimed at neutralizing the source of the threat as long as the harm caused is not
disproportional to the harm averted. The defense is confined to cases that do not qualify
for justification under a theory of self-defense.
Recently, Mordechai Kremnitzer and Khalid Ghanayim argued that self-defense
should justify the use of force only when it is necessary to repel a wrongful and culpable

aggression.3 They did so by defending an interest balancing approach to self-defense akin
to the one described in the previous section. The novelty of their argument, however, lies
in their contention that wrongful but nonculpable threats should trigger a right to use
justifiable force pursuant to a claim of passive necessity rather than self-defense.
The gist of the proposal consists in adopting a theory of necessity that attaches
considerable weight to determining which of the conflicting parties is the source of the
threatened harm. This consideration proves decisive in the case of the psychotic
aggressor. Although the harm inflicted by killing the insane assailant (death) is equal or
greater to the concrete harm averted by the victim (serious bodily injury or death), the
fact that the psychotic aggressor was the source of the threat tips the balance in favor of
the victim.
The rationale underlying this proposal appears to be that mere aggression,
regardless of whether it is unjustifiable or culpable, provides a basis for diminishing the
interests of the assailant in the balancing process. Yet this argument does not survive
critical examination. Why should someone’s interest be diminished by virtue of conduct
that cannot be characterized as either wrongful or culpable? One can understand
diminishing an aggressor’s interests if he acts wrongfully or if he is to blame for the
encounter, but it is hard to see why he should be worth less merely because his body is
the locus of the threat. Ultimately, this argument places too much emphasis on motion
and non-motion. Without consideration of whether the actor’s conduct is wrongful or
blameworthy, the mere fact that one party’s body is moving towards the body of another
seems to be a morally irrelevant feature of the conflict.
3
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III. AN AUTONOMY-BASED THEORY OF SELF-DEFENSE AS A JUSTIFICATION
What is it about the aggression that prompts us to think that the victim and the
third person ought to be able to kill the psychotic aggressor? The underlying judgment
must be that the victim has a right to the integrity and autonomy of his body and that he
has a right to prevent encroachments upon his living space. Respect for another person’s
autonomy is one of the foundational principles of our society. In each and every one of
our interactions with another human being we are under a duty to not interfere with their
autonomy. The duty, of course, is reciprocal, for others are also under a duty to respect
our freedom.
The notions of individual freedom and the right to protect autonomy underlie a
theory of self-defense that is not grounded on the balancing of interests. According to
this theory, the crux of the aggressor’s attack is that it unjustifiably threatens to encroach
upon the victim’s autonomy. Since an aggressor who engages in an unjustified attack has
breached his duty to respect the rights of the victim, the victim’s reciprocal duty to
respect the aggressor’s rights wanes. Thus, insofar as the aggressor unjustifiably
impinges upon the victim’s autonomy, the victim is no longer required to abstain from
interfering with the assailant’s liberty and is entitled to use whatever force is necessary to
repel the attack. It is assumed that the innocent defender has a right to prevent any
unwarranted encroachment upon his personal space. As German scholars have put it, the
Right should never yield to the wrong.4

4
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This theory provides a vehicle with which to clearly distinguish between the
justifications of self-defense and necessity. Whereas in cases of self-defense the conduct
that threatens to impinge on the victim’s freedom amounts to a breach of a duty to respect
the victim’s rights, in cases of justifiable necessity it does not. Thus, the person acting
under necessity is still required to fully respect the rights of the person who is the source
of the threat. Since none of the parties in a conflict that gives rise to a situation of
necessity has infringed their duty to respect the other’s rights, there is no reason to afford
less protection to the autonomy of the actor whose conduct originated the threat. As a
result, justification in cases of necessity can only follow when the good achieved by
interfering with the autonomy of one of the parties outweighs the harm caused by doing
so. The situation is different in cases of self-defense. Given that the aggressor has
breached his duty to respect the autonomy of the defending party, the attack may be
repelled even when doing so entails causing more harm than the one averted (e.g. the
victim may kill the aggressor in order to avoid serious bodily injury or rape).
This approach to self-defense is espoused by many German, Spanish and Soviet
criminal theorists. It also found expression in the early common law. Sir Edward Coke
insisted that no “man shall (ever) give way to a thief, etc., neither shall he forfeit
anything.”5 John Locke supported the same theory of an absolute right to protect one’s
liberty and rights from encroachment by aggressors.6 Among the various accounts of this
version of the self-defense, one finds the common theme that the act of aggression puts
the aggressor outside the protection of the law. Locke, for example, speaks of the
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aggressor’s being in a “state of war” with the defender.7 The argument is that the
aggression breaches an implicit contract among autonomous agents, according to which
each person or is bound to respect the living space of all others. The unwarranted
intrusion upon someone’s living space itself triggers a justified response.8
Only aggressions that amount to a breach of a duty to respect the victim’s
autonomy should trigger the right to use force in self-defense. This is the gist of the
Model Penal Code’s §3.04 requirement that self-defense only be exerted in response to
the use of “unlawful force” against the victim’s person. According to the Code, force
employed against another person is unlawful if it is constitutive of an “offense” or an
“actionable tort”. The requirement is sensible, for only conduct that is against the
criminal or civil law amounts to a breach of a legal duty to respect the rights of others.
We find the same requirement in continental criminal codes, which condition the use of
force in self-defense upon the existence of a “wrongful” (rechtswidrig in Germany,
ilegítima in Spain) aggression. The rationale for this proviso is clear. The wrongful
invasion of the defending party’s vital interests authorizes him to temporarily neglect his
duty to respect the autonomy of the aggressor to the extent that doing so is necessary to
ward off the threat.
It should be noted, however, that some threats that interfere with another person’s
autonomy do not trigger a right to use force in self-defense. This is most obviously the
case when someone interferes with another person’s freedom as a result of a justified
course of action. Take, for example, the case of a police officer who is effectuating a
lawful arrest. Even though the conduct certainly impinges upon the freedom of the
7
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arrestee, it would be mistaken to claim that the officer has violated his duty to respect the
rights others. Given that the officer’s aggression is justified, the arrestee has an
obligation to tolerate the interference with their liberty.
Aggressions that lack human agency constitute another example of nonwrongful attacks that should not justify using force in self-defense. Causal processes that
are not the product of human will are akin to natural events, even if they originate within
the confines of a human body. Therefore, claiming that acts not reflective of human
agency are wrongful is as erroneous as asserting that a threat that originates in a natural
event amounts to unlawful force. If there is no “act,” there can be no wrongful attack.
On the other hand, excused aggression qualifies as a wrongful attack that gives
rise to a claim of self-defense. We ought to be able to demand that others abide by their
duty to respect our autonomy regardless of their personal limitations and mental
conditions. Our legal system reflects this. As a perfunctory examination of the tort law
demonstrates, the mentally ill are under a duty to respect the rights of others in much the
same way as sane people are. There are good reasons for this to be the case. Our right to
be free from unlawful interferences with our person should not be compromised merely
because the threat to our autonomy originates in the acts of an inculpable person. The
defender does not have to pull his punches merely because the aggressor is mentally ill.
In such a confrontation on the street, the aggressor loses the protections that he would get
during a trial, that is, the right to plead excuses such as insanity or duress.

IV. Conclusion

Once we recognize that even a psychotic aggressor is under a duty to respect the
autonomy of others, one can see why his aggression can be justifiably warded off in selfdefense. In light of the wrongful nature of the attack, the victim’s reciprocal obligation to
show consideration for the psychotic aggressor’s autonomy weakens. As a result, the law
affords him a right to use whatever force is necessary to repel the unlawful aggression.
The fact that she psychotic actor would be acquitted on grounds of insanity if he were
tried for his aggression is beside the point, for excuses such as insanity do not negate the
wrongfulness of the act. Ultimately, the roots of the right to use defensive force are not
in the culpability of the aggressor, but in the unjustifiable invasion of the autonomy of the
defender. Furthermore, given that the victim’s use of force against the psychotic
aggressor is justifiable rather than merely excusable, third party intervention on behalf of
the victim of the attack should be considered lawful as well.

